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Abstract
This paper presents a non-uniform static analysis for detecting the term-substitution property in
infinite cryptographic processes specified by the language of the spi calculus. The analysis is fully
compositional following the denotational approach throughout. This renders the implementation of
the analysis straightforward in functional programming. The results are then used to detect certain
security breaches, like information leakage and authenticity breaches. As an example of its applicab-
ility, we apply the analysis to the SPLICE/AS protocol and the FTP server.
© 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The spi calculus [1] offers a process algebraic theory for the modelling of mobile cryp-
tographic systems that essentially extends the value-passing theory of the -calculus [2]
by the addition of primitives for performing cryptographic operations. We view the crypto-
graphic operations as adding extra value-processing behaviour to processes. One aspect of
the value-passing and value-processing behaviours that has significance when detecting
security breaches in processes is term substitution. Term substitutions occur whenever
communications as well as successful decryption, signature verification and tuple splitting,
take place. Security implications arise in scenarios where a process classified at a low
secrecy level obtains high-level data, or a process classified at a high trust level obtains
low-level data. We term the former information leakage and the latter authenticity breach.
In this paper, we propose a non-uniform static analysis that captures the property of
term substitutions in the spi calculus. The analysis is non-uniform in the sense that it
is capable of distinguishing between the different instances of these substitutions. The
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analysis is based on a closed denotational model of the language derived from Stark’s
domain-theoretic equations for the -calculus [3]. Apart from facilitating the use of com-
putationally important mathematical concepts, like fixed points, the denotational approach
has the advantage that it results in an implementation straightforward in functional pro-
gramming. The adopted abstraction limits, in a sound manner, the number of new names
and the depth of data structures, both of which can grow, in concrete semantics, to an
infinite level as a result of the presence of replication in infinite systems. Since the abstract
domain is kept finite, least fixed point calculations are guaranteed to terminate for our
monotonic semantic functions.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we review the main contributions
of this paper. In Section 3, we give an overview of related work. In Section 4, we review
the syntax and structural operational semantics of the spi calculus. In Section 5, we define
a domain-theoretic model for processes in the spi calculus and give a concrete definition
of the elements of this model. A denotational semantics is then given as a function from
syntactical processes to elements of the semantic domains. In Section 6, a non-standard
semantics is defined that captures the property of term substitution. In Section 7, a sound
approximation is defined that limits the size of the semantic domain to a finite limit. In
Section 8, we give a specification of Dolev–Yao’s most general attacker. In Section 9, we
define secrecy and authenticity breaches in terms of the state resulting from application of
the static analysis. These definitions are used to analyse the effects of one attack on the
SPLICE/AS protocol in Section 10. In Section 11, we give another example emphasising
the non-uniformity of the analysis to detect key usage in a secure FTP system. In Section
12, we review the design of the Spicaso tool, an implementation of the static analysis in
OCAML. We conclude the paper in Section 13 and discuss future work.
2. Main contributions
Denotational semantics. The paper defines a sound and adequate denotational semantics
for the spi calculus. The semantics is based on the predomain equations presented by Stark
in [3] for the -calculus extending these equations to include a predomain of complex
terms and permitting the presence of complex terms as messages of output actions. These
modifications allow for the modelling of the cryptographic capabilities of processes in the
spi calculus. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time such a domain-theoretic model
is defined for the spi calculus.
The static analysis of spi calculus. The paper presents a static analysis for reasoning
about the term-substitution property in mobile cryptographic systems that are potentially
infinite. The analysis is non-uniform in that it can distinguish between the different in-
stances of bound names (local data) and variables belonging to the different copies of
replicated processes. It also caters for the presence of intruder processes (e.g. the network)
that exhibit potentially harmful behaviour, by allowing the specification of the most general
attacker to be included in the analysis of any system. Finally, the approach adopted is fully
denotational, rather than the usual operational approach adopted in many analyses. This
approach has the following advantages:
• The resulting theory is often simple and close to its implementation in functional pro-
gramming. The use of the operational approach in constructing static analyses for
calculi of mobility has often resulted in complex analyses that are difficult to implement
(e.g. [4]).
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• Certain mathematical concepts that are computationally significant, like domains and
least fixed points, are directly available for the theory and implementation of the static
analysis.
• Finally, a denotational model allows for program properties (in our case, the term substi-
tution property) to be defined compositionally. In other words, the property of a program
can be defined from the properties of its subprograms. Such features provide foundation
for future work.
Program security. The state environment resulting from the analysis offers a common
ground for the definition of security properties based on the fundamental property of term
substitution. Thus far, we have provided definitions for the information leakage and authen-
ticity breach threats. We plan to extend the framework to define other security properties,
like communication security, freshness, anonymity and non-interference-based security.
Such unifying frameworks exist in literature, the most notable one being [5], based on the
non-interference property.
3. Related work
The work presented in this paper builds directly on previous work documented in
[6–9]. In [8,7], a denotational semantics and a static analysis for the -calculus is construc-
ted. The analysis captures the property of name substitution and defines secrecy properties.
The current paper represents an expansion on [6], with more detail on the theory included.
Full details are included in the Ph.D. thesis of [9].
The control flow analysis approach has been adopted on a number of occasions by
[10,11,12,13], in which the flow logics approach [14] is used to predict certain security
properties pertaining to mobile systems, like the confinement of private information and
the adherence to the Bell–La Padula properties [15]. The main analysis focuses on the
usage of channels and the values sent over them in the -calculus. In particular, a fresh
name is associated with a superset of the set of names that can be communicated over
that name. Also, an input parameter is associated with a superset of the set of names that
may substitute it at runtime. One major drawback with the manner by which the analysis
is carried out is that it identifies all the copies of a fresh name arising from the restric-
tion operator. This implies that non-uniform properties of names that change between the
different runs of systems cannot be expressed straightforwardly. The analysis also suffers
from the inability to detect certain deadlocks arising from situations where the channel of
communication is a fresh name with restricted scope.
The separation between the problem of validating a given solution and the construction
of such a solution as formulated by the flow logics approach, meant that the resulting
analyses of [10,11] are targeted towards the validation of a proposed solution rather than
offering a constructive algorithm. However, a minimum solution for the validating analysis
is proven to always exist, and in [12], a constructive algorithm for this minimum solution is
also supplied assuming a finite set of names. The security properties dealt with in [10,11]
are all based on the main control flow analysis. In [10], the confinement problem of private
names is the main property. In [11], the no read-up/no write-down property introduced
by Bell and La Padula [15] is investigated. This property is often regarded in the security
literature as a rigid form of security.
Finally, [13] provides a control flow analysis for a variant of the spi calculus with
history-dependent cryptography using the idea of confounders in encrypted messages. This
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facilitates the comparison of ciphertexts since, for example, {0, (ν r)}k /= {1, (ν r)}k . The
paper establishes two main results. First, it shows that the Dolev–Yao definition of secrecy
[16] is expressible in terms of a control flow analysis. No specification of the Dolev–Yao
most general attacker is provided; instead, it is computed using an approximation relation.
The second result establishes that the analysis can capture the form of non-interference
stated in [17]. This result elegantly separates between the issues of confidentiality and
non-interference using the control flow analysis approach.
Abstract interpretation has been applied effectively to the analysis of mobile systems.
Notable works include [4,18,19,20,21,22]. In [4], a sound non-uniform description of how
topologies evolve in closed systems that do not contain nested replications is presented.
The approach is based on the abstract data structures of [23], where the abstract meaning
of a process in the -calculus is represented as an undirected hypergraph (a hypergraph
is a graph where an edge can connect more than two vertices) signifying the sequence
of internal computations that evolve within a process from its initial specification. The
analysis was further developed and greatly simplified in [18], where a refined semantics
is introduced to capture the instance of a channel that establishes a link between two
processes.
The study of system interactions in [18] has inspired the analysis of [20], where the
main theme is detecting the leakage of confidential information in the presence of unknown
contexts. The analysis is non-uniform and can distinguish between the different instances
of a process. The open semantics takes into account the lack of specification of the intruder
processes and unlike [4,18], the analysis is not restricted to systems with no nested rep-
lications. Encoding the ability to deal with unknown specifications into the semantics is a
different alternative to our approach, which adopts a specification of the intruder (in our
case the Dolev–Yao most general attacker).
The analysis of [20] was extended in [21] in an occurrence counting analysis for detect-
ing the exhaustion of resources, mutual exclusion and deadlock properties. On the other
hand, a more generic parametric framework has been proposed in [22], which is capable of
expressing the equality and inequality relations between names, i.e. the dependency among
names at their creation point. The abstract interpretation approach has been used by [19]
to approximate cryptographic protocols specified in a cryptographic language with finite
principals and sessions (the spi calculus allows infinite principals and sessions) using tree
automata. An implementation of the analysis exists. However, it has been applied to small
protocols with finite runs only (mostly single runs).
Type systems have been extensively researched within the mobile systems and secur-
ity community and notable examples include the works of [17,24,25,26,27,28,29], where
properties related to information privacy, resource access control and trust are tackled.
In [24], a typing system is suggested for a distributed variant of the -calculus called
D, where processes reside at named locations and communications occur locally. In order
to be able to express remote communications, a process movement primitive is introduced.
The typing system introduces the notion of location types, where each location is typed
by the resources available to agents residing at that location. This will control the set of
capabilities that an agent can perform at a certain location. For example, the agent may
be able to send but not to receive data. Runtime errors are then used to express the breach
of type safety. These errors can detect illegal movements of processes as well as illegal
communications.
In [25], dynamic type checking is used to deal with malicious unspecified agents moving
between different sites. Open secure semantics are given for the language of D, where
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special bad types are used to distinguish untyped code in what is known as a partial typing
system, where only a subset of agents is well-typed. Filters are used by sites to judge
the trustworthiness of an incoming agent. Based on this judgement, a notion of authority
from which trust between the different sites harbouring processes can be built. Hence, the
need for dynamic type checking is, in fact, reduced. The correctness of the behaviour of
well-typed processes is shown to be sound with respect to well-behaving sites.
A more extensive treatment of the subject of trust in mobile systems modelled by
the -calculus is given in [29]. Here, a system of Boolean annotations is used to guarantee
that only trusted data are used in trusted contexts. The system relies on a notion of
trust during run time. An algorithm for creating the general types of the system is also
suggested.
In [27], two security properties, the resource access control and information flow prop-
erties, are dealt with in a typing system for a variant of the asynchronous -calculus [30,31]
with security levels. Using a security policy that assigns levels to processes, a process can
only access resources that were created by processes running at the same or lower levels.
Similarly, a process can only write to resources created by higher-level processes. On the
other hand, implicit flow of information is dealt with by a notion of non-interference, which
depends on a form of may-testing.
An advanced static type checking system is used in [28] to guarantee secure information
flow for general process behaviour in the polyadic -calculus extended with extra syntactic
constructs. In this typing system, non-linear types are used as part of a finite partially
ordered set of action types. The action type of a process is an abstraction of the causal
dependency among the free channels of that process. With the use of secrecy indices,
a subject reduction property of the resulting typed processes is given. This implies that
composing a typed process with external processes does not change its internal secrecy.
The subject reduction property is then used to express a form of non-interference among
low-level and high-level processes. The resulting system is also used to embed the system
of [32], using typed process representation.
One of the major drawbacks of type systems is their inability to express non-uniform
properties due to the fact that they associate the same type with the different runs of the sys-
tem. In [26], this problem was remedied by introducing a primitive for fresh type creation.
Special channel types called Groups can be created, where names of a type belonging to
a particular group cannot be communicated over channels of another group type (possibly
with a lower secrecy level). This will protect against the leakage of secret channels from
one group to another.
It seems, to date, that the work of [17] has assumed an authoritative role in the subject
of security and types in the spi calculus. This is simply due to the wealth of basic concepts
that the work contains, and in particular, the idea of mixing (primitively) typed and untyped
data in the typing system and the idea that every participant in a security protocol must be
typable. An overall view of secrecy principles is also given in the context of the spi calcu-
lus. The proposed typing system guarantees the protection of secret data against leakage
through a notion of non-interference that is based on testing equivalence. However, the
system does not clarify the issue of principal types and therefore, no complete and sound
typing algorithm is provided.
Another extension of the asynchronous -calculus, termed the security -calculus is
suggested by [33] that incorporates a type system where security levels and read/write
capabilities are associated with input parameters and restricted names. May and must
testing equivalences are then formalised for the language and based on these equivalence
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formalisations, notions of non-interference are enforced. The work is a comprehensive
extension of the earlier work presented in [27].
Finally, the compositional security checker (CoSeC) developed in [34] is a static
analysis tool that builds on the Concurrency Workbench [35]. Both tools are forms of
semantics-based model checkers that can check for properties of processes based on dif-
ferent equivalences and preordering. The language of input for CoSeC is an extension of
CCS with separately marked high-level and low-level observable actions. The treatment
of the tool benefits only finite state systems and is targeted towards the checking of the
non-deducibility-on-compositions property.
Other approaches. Other approaches that cannot be directly classified under the pre-
vious headings or that may cover more than one approach have also been suggested and
implemented. The work of [36] is an early attempt to present an abstract binding-time
analysis as part of a meta-interpreter for the -calculus. The analysis adopts a partial
evaluation technique, which aims at using the known part of the input data in special-
ising programs. The results of the analysis can determine the static communications that
can be executed at compile-time as well as the set of static variables that do not change
during run-time. The main motivation behind the work of [36] was program optimisation
rather than security (although the results are general enough to include some notion of
security).
The mobility workbench [37] is an example of automated tools that are targeted to-
wards the checking of process equivalences. In particular, the tool checks for the open
bisimulation property in the -calculus [38].
In the work of [39] a typing system is given for a generic version of the spi calculus with
constructor/destructor functions. Untyped predicate logic is also used to program a Prolog-
based protocol checker that verifies secrecy properties. The methodology is extended, in
[40], to check for the authenticity property. The equivalence of the two approaches is
established. In [41,42], a trace analysis is built over a symbolic version of the operational
semantics of the spi calculus, and in [43], a well-crafted approach to the symbolic analysis
of cryptographic processes, in general, is formalised. Earlier attempts to use symbolic
semantics in the analysis of security protocols include [44,45], where the reachability
problem in the cryptographic protocols is discussed.
The works of [46,47] have concentrated on the use of automatic checking of equival-
ences of processes in the spi calculus. The former presents a framework for a trace-based
analysis of cryptographic protocols, whereas the latter defines a new equivalence, known as
fenced bisimilarity, which removes some of the infinite quantifiers associated with testing
equivalence in the spi calculus.
Finally, we mention the works of [48,49]. In [48], belief logics have been used to analyse
a number of cryptographic protocols and the paper is a notable piece of work. The model
checking approach has also been used with the Brutus checker for a dialect of the spi
calculus in [49]. More recently, the mobility model checker (MMC) has been introduced
in [50], as a model checker for the -calculus, which uses tabled logic programming.
Denotational models of mobility. Several denotational semantic models have been in-
troduced for the -calculus over the past few years [51,52,53,54,55,56,3]. Apart from a few
examples, the majority of these works adopt an approach based on category theory.
The models of [54,3] are closely related in their underlying theory. Both are fully ab-
stract with respect to late bisimilarity and equivalence. The major difference between the
two is that [54] defines the semantics in terms of an internal meta-language for the main
category. The language is, in fact, a type-equational theory based on a typed -calculus
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with non-deterministic summation and recursion. The interpretation of processes is then
given by translating into this meta-language. On the other hand, the model of [3] is more
abstract and concentrates on properties of the categorical solution.
Stark’s model was further refined in [53] using presheaf categories. These are more flex-
ible as they support function spaces and offer models for synchronisation trees and event
structures. Unlike the models of [54,3], the resulting model is capable of expressing early,
as well as, late semantics and hence, it is fully abstract with respect to early bisimilarity
and equivalence. Since our static analysis framework is not designed to necessarily deal
with the early version of the semantics, we opted for the less elaborate model given in [3].
Two set-theoretic denotational models are presented in [56] that are fully abstract with
respect to may- and must-testing in the -calculus. The models are obtained as solutions of
domain equations in a functor category and are quite close to the works of [54,3]. A higher-
order version of the -calculus, where functions as well as names can be communicated
over channels, is modelled denotationally in [55]. An internal language is also given for the
solution O-category, which is used in the process interpretation. The model is only proven
to be fully abstract for transitions in the higher-order language.
Finally, in [51], a new notion of Cartesian closed double categories is developed from
the theory of Cartesian closed categories and used as a basis for the interpretation of the
-calculus.
4. The spi calculus: syntax and structural operational semantics
The basic building blocks in the spi calculus are terms. Terms are divided into primitive
and complex. The notion of primitive terms is a refined notion of names that distinguishes
between constants, a, b, c, k, A,B,C . . . ∈N, which cannot be instantiated, and vari-
ables, x, y, z,X, Y . . . ∈V, which can be instantiated. We allow primitive terms to be
subscripted with numbers. Complex terms are obtained by applying cryptographic and
tuple creation operations. Based on this, Fig. 1 illustrates the syntax of terms, M,N ∈
Term, and of processes, P,Q ∈ P, in the spi calculus. We write k+ and k− to distinguish
between the public and private parts of a key pair.
Informally, processes are described as follows. A null process, 0, is incapable of evolving
any further. An input guard, M(x).P , allows for a process to input a message, N , over a
channel defined by M and continues as the residue P [N/x]. An output guard, M〈N〉.P ,
allows a process to send a message, N , over the channel defined by M and continues as
P . Although the forms of the input/output actions allow for the generic use of terms as
channels, this is only valid for the cases where the term is a name or a variable that is
instantiated to a name. The same is required of keys, since keys are treated as names due to
their unguessable nature. The restriction, parallel composition, replication and conditional
processes are all standard. Tuple-splitting, let (x1, . . . , xn) = M in P , attempts to split a
term, M , and binds the resulting components to local variables, x1, . . . , xn, in a process
P . However, if this fails (i.e. M has an incorrect arity), then the process blocks. Secret-key
decryption, case L of {x}N in P , and public-key decryption, case L of {[x]}N in P , attempt
to decrypt a term L with key N . If successful, the resulting term is bound to a local variable
x in some process, P , otherwise, the process blocks. Similarly, the signature verification
process, case L of [{x}]N in P , attempts to verify a term, L, using N and if successful, the
resulting term is bound to a local variable, x, in P . Otherwise, if the verification fails, the
process blocks.
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Fig. 1. The syntax of the spi calculus.
The standard notions of term substitution and α-conversion, as well as the free and
bound variables and free and bound names of processes and terms, fv(A), bv(A), fn(A),
bn(A), all apply as usual. We also use the notion of bound names and variables of a process,
written as bnv(P ) = bn(P ) ∪ bv(P ). Finally, the set of names of a process or a term is
written as n(P ) or n(t), respectively. A process P or a term M is closed if fv(P ) = {}
or fv(M) = {}. Henceforth, we shall only deal with closed processes and closed terms.
Moreover, we only consider systems whose bound names and bound variables are initially
distinct from each other and from the set of free names of the particular process.
The language semantics is defined by two relations: the structural congruence relation,
≡, and the labelled transition relation, s−→. The structural congruence relation is defined
as the smallest equivalence, closed by the renaming of bound names and variables (α-
conversion), that satisfies the following rules:
• (P/≡, |, 0) is a commutative monoid
• (ν a)0 ≡ 0
• (ν a)(ν b)P ≡ (ν b)(ν a)P
• (ν a)(P |Q) ≡ (P |(ν a)Q) if a /∈ fn(P )
• !P ≡ P | !P
• [M = N]P ≡
{
P, if M = N
0, otherwise
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Fig. 2. Rules of the labelled transition relation in the spi calculus.
• let (x1, . . . , xn) = L in P ≡
{
P [M1/x1, . . . ,Mn/xn], if L = (M1, . . . ,Mn)
0, otherwise
• case L of {x}k in P ≡
{
P [M/x], if L = {M}k
0, otherwise
• case L of {[x]}k− in P ≡
{
P [M/x], if L = {[M]}k+
0, otherwise
• case L of [{x}]k+ in P ≡
{
P [M/x], if L = [{M}]k−
0, otherwise
The labelled transition relation is defined in Fig. 2, closed by the structural congruence
of processes.
The s-transitions include input actions, m(x), free output actions, m〈N〉, bound output
actions, (νn1, . . . , νnk)m〈N〉 (where {n1, . . . , nk} ⊆ fn(N)) and silent actions, τ . The
rules are described as follows. Rules (OUT) and (IN) express free output and input trans-
itions. Rule (OPEN) transforms a free output to a bound output by restricting names ap-
pearing free in the message of communication. Rules (RES) and (PAR) state that transitions
are preserved under the restriction and parallel composition operators, provided that the
side conditions are satisfied. Finally, communications are carried out in rules (COMM) and
(CLOSE) for the cases of free and bound output actions, respectively. The external effects
of these communications appear as silent actions, τ .
5. A domain-theoretic model
We propose, in this section, an extension of Stark’s domain-theoretic model [3].
The extension is capable of handling the complexity inherent in the communicated
data structures in spi calculus processes as well as the possibility of extruding multiple
names through those structures. Consider the following predomain1equations, which un-
derlie the primitive behaviour of input, output and silent actions as well as termination
or deadlock:
1 Recall that a predomain is a Scott domain without the bottom element.
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Spi ∼= 1 + P(Spi⊥ + In + Out) (1)
In ∼= N × (T → Spi⊥) (2)
Out ∼= N × (T × Spi⊥ +N → · · ·N → (T × Spi⊥)) (3)
T ∼= N + Sec + Pub + Sig + Tup (4)
Sec ∼= T ×N (5)
Pub ∼= T ×N (6)
Sig ∼= T ×N (7)
Tup ∼= T × · · · × T (8)
where Spi⊥ is the domain of processes, In and Out are the predomains of input and output
actions, respectively. Input actions are modelled as pairs; a name, N (the channel), and a
function, T → Spi⊥, that can be instantiated with a term, T , yielding a process in Spi⊥.
Output actions are divided into free and bound output actions. These are pairs consisting of
the channel, N , and either another pair, T × Spi⊥, denoting the message, T , and the residue
Spi⊥ (free outputs), or composed functions, N → · · ·N → (T × Spi⊥), that introduce
new names to the message, T , and the residue, Spi⊥ (bound outputs). P(−) is Plotkin’s
powerdomain [57] applied to the disjoint union of input, output and silent actions (the
latter represented by Spi⊥) to construct Spi. The one-element predomain, 1, representing
terminated (deadlocked) processes is adjoined as in [58, Def. 3.4]. The flat predomain of
closed terms, T , is defined as the disjoint union of the predomains of names, N , secret-key
ciphers, Sec, public-key ciphers, Pub, digital signatures, Sig and finite tuples, Tup. The pre-
domains Sec, Pub and Sig can be expressed as pairs, where a term, T , is encrypted/signed
with a key, N .
In addition to the presence of a predomain of terms, there are other differences between
these equations and Stark’s equations [3]. First, input actions contain a functional element,
T → Spi⊥, that is capable of being instantiated with any term, not just names. Second, free
output actions are also equipped to send messages that are generic terms, T . Moreover,
bound output actions are expressed as a finite number of functions, N → · · ·N → (T ×
Spi⊥), that take as arguments names and yield other functions until eventually resulting in
a pair representing the message of communication, T , and the residual process, Spi⊥. This
expresses the fact that bound outputs in the spi calculus can extrude the scope of multiple
names, not just one name, as is the case with the -calculus.
A number of continuous mappings leading into Spi⊥ are also defined, to express the
manner in which semantic elements are constructed [58, Def. 3.3]:
∅ : 1→ Spi⊥ (9)
{| − |} : (Spi⊥ + In + Out)⊥→ Spi⊥ (10)
unionmulti : (Spi⊥ × Spi⊥)→ Spi⊥ (11)
new : (N → Spi⊥)→ Spi⊥ (12)
The empty set, ∅, is required to represent inactive processes. The singleton map, {| − |},
creates elements of Spi⊥ from elements of input, output and silent actions. new is used
to interpret the effects of restriction. Finally, unionmulti, is the standard multiset union operator
representing non-determinism.
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Fig. 3. Elements of the predomain of terms T .
Fig. 4. Elements of In, Out, and Spi⊥.
We construct a concrete solution for Eqs. (1)–(8) that is based on domain theory. To
specify elements of Spi⊥, it is necessary to determine elements of all the other semantic
domains. We start with the predomain of terms, T . Assuming K is the set underlying
any domain, then elements t ∈ K(T ) are defined in Fig. 3. Due to the assumption that
cryptographic functions are total over their arguments, which are of the appropriate type
(e.g. keys are names), the predomain of terms, T , appears to be flat with discrete struc-
ture and no bottom elements. The disjoint union guarantees that cryptographic terms with
similar elements are distinguished from each other as well as from the 2-element tuples
(pairs). This is achieved by tagging the cryptographic terms with appropriate tags, sec,
pub and sig. From these semantic terms, the concrete elements of the predomains of
In and Out are given leading to a solution of Eqs. (1)–(3) specifying elements of the
domain of processes, Spi⊥. First, elements arising from ∅, {| − |} and unionmulti are defined in
Fig. 4.
The effects of restricting a name to a process are interpreted by giving a concrete defin-
ition of new in terms of the simpler elements arising from ∅, unionmulti and {| − |} as shown in
Fig. 5. This definition reveals the following points. Restricting a name to ∅ has no effect
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Fig. 5. The definition of new for the spi calculus.
since this represents a null process. Similarly, restricting a name to the bottom element,
{|⊥|}, yields no effect and the final meaning is still undefined. For the case of input actions,
restricting the name of the input channel will render the final meaning as that of the in-
active process, since no communications can take part over a fresh non-extruded channel.
Otherwise, the interpretation of the restriction resumes over the residue without affecting
the input variable (assuming that all bound names are distinct). In the case of free output
actions, restricting the name of the output message will turn the free output actions into
a bound output action. On the other hand, restricting a name in the message of a bound
output action will result in adding that name as a λ-variable for the output message. This
is required to express the fact that the restricted name’s scope is being extruded. It is worth
mentioning at this point that one of the main differences in the definition of new here from
Stark’s definition in [3, §3.2] is that a bound output is allowed to have a finite number
of bound names, not just a single name. This is due to the complex nature of messages
in the spi calculus (as opposed to pure nominal messages in the -calculus). Finally, the
interpretation of restrictions has no effect over silent actions and it is distributed over the
choice operator.
The denotational semantics for the spi calculus can now be given as a semantic function
S([P ]) ρ φS ∈ Spi⊥ defined by the set of rules of Fig. 6. The multiset, ρ, is used to hold
processes composed in parallel with the analysed process. The standard singleton, {| − |}ρ :
P→ ℘(P), and the multiset union, unionmultiρ : ℘(P)× ℘(P)→ ℘(P), are special mappings
defined over ρ and should not be confused with {| − |} and unionmulti defined earlier in (10) and
(11), respectively. The environment, φS : V → T⊥, where V is the predomain of variables,
captures any term substitutions that occur in the semantics. The special function, ϕS :
(V → T⊥)× Term → T , returns the semantic value of a term, given substitutions recorded
by φS :
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Fig. 6. The denotational semantics of the spi calculus.
∀φS ,M : ϕS(φS ,M) =


φS(M), if M ∈ V
M, if M ∈ N
sec(ϕS(φS ,M ′), ϕS(φS , N)), if M = {M ′}N
pub(ϕS(φS ,M ′), ϕS(φS , N)), if M = {[M ′]}N
sig(ϕS(φS ,M ′), ϕS(φS , N)), if M = [{M ′}]N
(ϕS(φS ,M1), . . . , ϕS(φS ,Mn)), if M = M1, . . . ,Mn
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Note that since we only deal with closed terms, the case where M = x ∈ V and φS(x) = ⊥
will never be encountered (open terms).
The description of rules (S1)–(S11) is as follows. Rule (S1) interprets the meaning of a
null process as the empty set mapping, ∅. Rules (S2) and (S3) deal with processes guarded
with input and output actions, respectively. Rule (S3) considers communications between
the output channel and appropriate input channels guarding processes in ρ. The φS is
updated in (S3) appropriately with semantic elements. Rule (S4) uses the new mapping
to interpret the meaning of a restriction. Rule (S5) interprets directly parallel composition
by the addition of the parallel subprocesses to ρ. Rule (S6) interprets a replicated process,
!P , as the least upper bound of the infinite poset F . This least upper bound represents
the least fixed point of meaning of !P . Due to the fact that the semantic domain, Spi⊥, is
infinite, the calculation of this least fixed point may not terminate within finite limits. The
rule also uses the labelling mechanism to rename all the bound variables and names of the
spawned processes by subscripting those variables and names with a number signifying
each spawned copy. Since this renaming of bound variables and names is, in fact, α-
conversion, the resulting process on the right side of the rule is structurally equivalent
to a subprocess of the replication on the left side. This preserves the compositionality
of the denotational semantics since the α-converted process is still a subprocess of the
replication.
The rest of the rules rely on the meaning of terms as held by the φS environment before
resolving the analysed process. In rule (S7), the meaning of two terms is compared, and
depending on the result, P is chosen and added to ρ. Rules (S8)–(S11) deal with tuple
splitting and cryptographic processes. The result of the tuple splitting and cryptographic
operations are used to update the φS with the appropriate semantic terms. A residual pro-
cess, P , signifying the success of the operation is also added to ρ. In case an operation
fails, ∅ is returned. Finally, rule (RS0) is used to interpret the contents of the ρ multiset.
We can now state the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Soundness and adequacy of Spi⊥ w.r.t. transitions). The interpretation of
processes in Spi⊥ is sound and adequate with respect to transitions in the spi calculus.
Proof. The soundness property relies on the ability of semantic elements p to match
transitions in the operational model. Hence:
P
m〈N〉−→ Q ⇒ out(m, ϕS(φS ,M),S([Q]) ρ φS) ∈ S([P ]) ρ φS
P
(ν n1,... ,ν nk)m〈N〉−→ Q⇒ out(m, λn1 . . . λnk.(ϕS(φS , N),S([Q]) ρφS)) ∈ S([P ]) ρφS
P
m(x)−→Q ⇒ in(m, λx.S([Q]) ρ φS) ∈ S([P ]) ρ φS
P
τ−→Q ⇒ tau(S([Q]) ρ φS) ∈ S([P ]) ρ φS
On the other hand, adequacy requires that the semantic transitions must be mapped
correctly to the operational model. Hence:
out(m, t, q) ∈ S([P ])ρ φS ⇒ ∃Q : P m〈N〉−→ Q ∧ ϕS(φS , N) = t ∧ S([Q])ρ φS = q
out(m, λn1 . . . λnk.(t, q)) ∈ S([P ]) ρ φS ⇒ ∃Q : P (ν n1,... ,ν nk)m〈N〉−→ Q ∧
ϕS(φS , N) = t ∧ S([Q]) ρ φS = q
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in(m, λx.q) ∈ S([P ]) ρ φS ⇒ ∃Q : P m(x)−→Q ∧ S([Q]) ρ φS = q
tau(q) ∈ S([P ]) ρ φS ⇒ ∃Q : P τ−→Q ∧ S([Q]) ρ φS = q
The proof of soundness proceeds by induction on the structure of the semantic rules,
whereas the proof of adequacy requires a formal approximation relation, pP , between
elements p ∈ Spi⊥ and processes P ∈ P. This relation is popular in similar adequacy
proofs in the -calculus. 
6. Non-standard semantics
The standard denotational meaning of a process, as modelled by Spi⊥, does not give
information on the property we are interested in, i.e. term substitution. Therefore, to trace
term substitutions during the evolution of processes, we define a special environment
φE : V → ℘(T ) that maps each variable of a closed process to the set of semantic terms
that may substitute that variable during the evaluation of the meaning of a process. Since
the non-standard semantics is precise (copies of bound names and variables are always
distinct), each variable will be mapped to a singleton set at most per choice of control flow,
representing the term that substitutes the variable.
A domain, D⊥ = V → ℘(T ), can be constructed, ordered by subset inclusion:
∀φE1, φE2 ∈ D⊥ : φE1 D⊥ φE2 ⇔ ∀x ∈ V : φE1(x) ⊆ φE2(x)
With the bottom element,⊥D⊥ , being the null environment, φE0, that maps each variable
to the empty set. The union of environments operation, ∪φ , can also be defined as follows:
∀φE1, φE2 ∈ D⊥, x ∈ V : (φE1 ∪φ φE2)(x) = φE1(x) ∪ φE2(x)
The non-standard semantic domain is formed by pairing D⊥ with the standard semantic
domain, Spi⊥, resulting in Spi⊥ ×D⊥. The bottom element of this domain is the pair
(⊥Spi⊥ ,⊥D⊥) representing ∅ and φE0.
The non-standard semantics for the spi calculus is defined by the semantic function,
E([P ]) ρ φE ∈ (Spi⊥ ×D⊥), on the structure of P as in Fig. 7, where in what follows, we
have that fst(x1, x2) = x1 and snd(x1, x2) = x2. The definition of the ϕE : (V → ℘(T ))×
Term → T function allows for the meaning of a term to be computed under a particular φE
environment:
∀φE ,M : ϕE (φE ,M)=


t, if M ∈ V ∧ φE (M) = {t}
M, if M ∈ N
sec(ϕE (φE ,M ′), ϕE (φE , N)), if M = {M ′}N
pub(ϕE (φE ,M ′), ϕE (φE , N)), if M = {[M ′]}N
sig(ϕE (φE ,M ′), ϕE (φE , N)), if M = [{M ′}]N
(ϕE (φE ,M1), . . . , ϕE (φE ,Mn)), if M = (M1, . . . ,Mn)
Also, the ρ multiset holds all the processes in parallel with the process under inter-
pretation. The semantic rules are described as follows. In rule (E1), the meaning of a
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Fig. 7. The non-standard semantics of the spi calculus.
null process is described as the pair (∅, φE ), where φE is the environment supplied to
the rule initially. Rules (E2) and (E3) deal with the cases of input and output actions,
respectively. Communications are dealt with in rule (E3) for output actions, therefore, φE
remains unchanged in rule (E2) for input actions. The rule for output actions requires that
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terms used as channels should evaluate to names, and communications occur whenever
an input channel is matched in ρ. The value of φE is updated with the message term
substituting the input parameter. Note that in both rules above for input and output actions,
any substitutions occurring inside unmatched guards as a result of communications that
may take place between the residue and the rest of processes in ρ, have no effect on the φA
environment, since we are only interested in substitutions resulting from communications
between matched output and input actions.
Rule (E4) interprets the meaning of a restriction using the new operation on the first
element of the resulting pair, whereas the second element reflects the environment resulting
from the residue. This is justified as internal communications are preserved by restriction.
Rule (E5) adds two parallel processes to the multiset, ρ. The meaning of a replicated
process in rule (E6) is defined as the least upper bound of the poset, F , of non-standard
semantic elements. Since the non-standard semantic domain, Spi⊥ ×D⊥, is infinite, it may
not be possible to calculate this least fixed point within finite limits. Also, α-conversion
renames the set of bound names and variables of each process copy, while maintaining
the compositionality of the semantics. Rule (E7) deals with a conditional process based
on the semantic equality of the compared terms. Pair splitting is dealt with in rule (E8)
where the φE is updated to hold the result of the substitution of local variables by elements
of a tuple. The rest of the rules (E9)–(E11) deal with cryptographic processes performing
secret-key decryption, public-key decryption and digital signature verification. The φE is
updated for successful operations and returned unchanged otherwise.
The correctness requirement for the non-standard semantics of the spi calculus, with
respect to its standard semantics, is expressed in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (Correctness of the non-standard semantics).
∀P ∈ P : (S([P ]) ρ φS = p) ∧ (E([P ]) ρ φE = (p′, φ′E )) ⇒ p = p′.
Proof. The correctness requirement can be shown to hold by induction over the structure
of the non-standard semantics, comparing in each case with the corresponding rule in the
standard semantics. A formal proof would introduce an extraction function that extracts
the standard part of the non-standard meaning and then by showing that the standard
meaning is equal to the extracted element, it is possible to arrive at the same conclusion as
above. 
In effect, the theorem states that the standard element of the non-standard semantics is
equivalent to the value obtained from the standard semantics. In other words, the standard
meaning can be extracted from the non-standard meaning.
7. Abstract semantics
As we mentioned earlier in the previous section, the non-standard semantics of the spi
calculus contains least fixed point calculations that may not be computable (in the rule for
replication). To obtain a computable semantics, whose termination is guaranteed, a sound
abstraction is required to remove the source of infinite growth in the semantic domain
Spi⊥ ×D⊥. For example, consider the following simple system:
!((νm)n〈m〉.P |n(y).Q)
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As a result of the infinite communications within this system, its non-standard semantics
will yield (as part of its meaning) an infinite trace of silent actions tau(tau(tau(. . . as well
as a φE environment that maps every instance yj to {mj }, for j = 1 . . .∞.
We assume a finite predomain of tags, Tag, ranged over by t, t˙ , t¨ , where t is the tag of a
generic term, t˙ is the tag of a primitive term (name, variable) and t¨ is the tag of a complex
term (ciphertext, signature, tuple). Next we tag (sub)terms of the analysed process with
unique tags. More precisely, we tag M in the following constructs:
let (x1, . . . , xn) = (M1, . . . ,Mn) in P
case {M}L of {x}N in P
case {[M]}L of {[x]}N in P
case [{M}]L of [{x}]N in P
N〈M〉.P
For example, tagging the term {({a}c, {b}e)}d yields {({a ˙t1} ¨t1c , {b ˙t2} ¨t2e ) ¨t3} ¨t4d . Now, we
can define the following functions over tags, terms and processes:
• value_of({t1, . . . , tn}) = {M1, . . . ,Mn}. This function can be applied to a set of tags,
{t1, . . . , tn}, returning the corresponding set of terms, {M1, . . . ,Mn}. Hence, value_of
({ ˙t1, ¨t4}) = {a ˙t1, {({a ˙t1} ¨t1c , {b ˙t2} ¨t2e ) ¨t3} ¨t4d }.• tags_of(P ) = {t1, . . . , tn}. This function returns the set of tags, {t1, . . . , tn}, used in a
process, P . For example, tags_of(m〈a ˙t1〉.m〈{(b ˙t2, c ˙t3) ¨t1} ¨t2k 〉.0) = { ˙t1, ˙t2, ˙t3, ¨t1, ¨t2}.• untag({M ′1, . . . ,M ′n}) = {M1, . . . ,Mn}. When applied to a set of tagged terms,{M ′1, . . . ,M ′n}, this function removes all associated tags yielding a set of untagged
terms, {M1, . . . ,Mn}. Hence, untag({at˙5, {(at˙1, {bt˙2}t¨2e )t¨3}t¨4d }) = {a, {(a, {b}e)}d}. The
function behaves as id if a term, M ′, has no tags.
We now introduce the αk,k′ abstraction function, which keeps to a finite level, the
number of copies of bound variables, names and tags captured in the abstract semantics.
Definition 1. Define the abstraction, αk,k′ : N×N× (V +N+Tag)→ (V .+N.+Tag.):
∀M ∈ (V +N + Tag), i, k, k′ ∈ N : αk,k′(M) =


t˙k, if M = t˙i ∈ Tag ∧ i > k
t¨k′ , if M = t¨i ∈ Tag ∧ i > k′
xk, if M = xi ∈ V ∧ i > k
ak, if M = ai ∈ N ∧ i > k
M, otherwise
The resulting abstract predomains, V ., N. and Tag., can be defined as V . = V \{xj |
j > k}, N. = N\{aj | j > k} and Tag. = Tag\({t˙j | j > k} ∪ {t¨i | i > k′}). Informally, k
constrains the number of bound variables and names, and tags of primitive terms, whereas
k′ constrains the number of tags of complex terms. In effect, constraining the tags of
primitive terms implies limiting the copies of bound names and variables carrying the
tags, whereas constraining the number of tags of complex terms means limiting the depth
of complex data structures.
For example, in the process !(ν n)a〈nt˙ 〉 | !a(x), it is possible to spawn infinite copies
of each replication:
!(νn)a〈nt˙ 〉 | !a(x) | (νn1)a〈nt˙11 〉 | a(x1) | (νn2)a〈nt˙22 〉 | a(x2) | · · ·
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It is clear that t˙ is an indicator to the number of copies the new name, n, has after spawning
each process. On the other hand, the process !a(x).a〈{x}t¨k〉 | a〈b〉, which can be rewritten
as:
!a(x).a〈{x}t¨k〉 | a(x1).a〈{x1}t¨1k 〉 | a(x2).a〈{x2}t¨2k 〉 | a〈b〉 | · · ·
demonstrates the role of t¨ as an indicator to the number of times the ciphertext, {x}k , is
applied to the name, b.
Using the αk,k′ abstraction, we construct the abstract environment φA : V . → ℘(Tag.),
which maps each abstract bound variable of the analysed process to a set of tags, repres-
enting terms that could substitute that variable during the abstract semantics. An abstract
domain D.⊥ = V . → ℘(Tag.) is formed ordered by subset inclusion:
∀φA1, φA2 ∈ D.⊥, x ∈ V . : φA1 D.⊥ φA2 ⇔ φA1(x) ⊆ φA2(x)




, is the null environment, φA0, mapping each variable to { }.
Taking D.⊥ as the abstract semantic domain, we can define the abstract semantics of the
spi calculus by the function A([P ]) ρ φA ∈ D.⊥, shown in Fig. 8.
The semantics utilises the multiset, ρ, to hold all the processes in parallel with the ana-
lysed process. The special function, ϕA : (V . → ℘(Tag.))× Term → ℘(Term), returns a
set of terms corresponding to a term, M , given substitutions captured by φA:
ϕA(φA,M) = ϕ′A(φA,M ′){},
where, M ′ = M[αk,k′(t)/t][αk,k′(x)/x][αk,k′(n)/n] and,





ϕ′A(φA, L)s∪{M} if M ∈ V .
{M}, if M ∈ N.
{{N ′}t
L′ | N ′ ∈ ϕ′A(φA, N)s∪{M}, L′ ∈ ϕ′A(φA, L)s∪{M} }, if M = {N}tL{{[N ′]}t
L′ | N ′ ∈ ϕ′A(φA, N)s∪{M}, L′ ∈ ϕ′A(φA, L)s∪{M}}, if M = {[N]}tL{[{N ′}]t
L′ | N ′ ∈ ϕ′A(φA, N)s∪{M}, L′ ∈ ϕ′A(φA, L)s∪{M} }, if M = [{N}]tL{(M ′1, . . . ,M ′n)t | M ′1 ∈ ϕ′A(φA,M1)s∪{M}, . . . ,M ′n ∈ ϕ′A(φA,Mn)s∪{M} },
if M=(M1,. . .,Mn)t
For example, consider ϕA([x %→ {t1, t2}, y %→ {t3}], {x}y) = {{M1}N, {M2}N }, where
value_of({t1}) = {M1}, value_of({t2}) = {M2} and value_of({t3}) = {N}. The description
of the rules is as follows. Rules (A1) and (A2) return the φA environment unchanged.
Communications are dealt with in rule (A3) for output actions, where synchronising output
and input channels yield a communication, in which the tag of the message is captured by
φA. The semantics is imprecise, since φA only captures an abstract tag as a value for
an abstract variable. Rules (A4) and (A5) deal with the cases of restriction and parallel
composition directly by placing the subprocesses with the rest in ρ.
The rule for replication, (A6), defines the least upper bound of the poset, F , as the
least fixed point of the meaning of a replicated process. The following theorem states that,
unlike the case for the standard and non-standard semantics, the calculation of the least
fixed point in abstract semantics is guaranteed to terminate due to the finite nature of the
semantic domain, D.⊥.
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Fig. 8. The abstract semantics of the spi calculus.
Theorem 3 (Termination of the least fixed point calculation). The calculation of rule (A6)
terminates.
Proof. To prove the termination property, it is necessary to satisfy two requirements.
First, the semantic domain must be finite. This is satisfied by the definition of D.⊥. The
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second requirement is to prove the monotonicity of A([∏
i
P ]) ρ φA, i.e. A([
∏
i
P ]) ρ φA 
A([∏
i+1
P ]) ρ φA. To prove this, we simplify the inequality into A([ Q ]) ρ φA  A([ Q |
P ]) ρ φA, where Q =
∏
i
P . This is further simplified to become A([Q ]) ρ φA  A([Q ])
ρ′ φA, where ρ′ = ρ unionmultiρ {|P |}ρ . This can be proven by induction overA([ P ]) ρ φA. In par-
ticular, the most interesting cases are rules (A3) and (A8)–(A11), where φA changes. For
example, in rule (A3), we have that since ρ ⊆ ρ′, then M ′(y).P ′ ∈ ρ ⇒ M ′(y).P ′ ∈ ρ′.
From this we can conclude that A([ Q ]) ρ φA  A([ Q ]) ρ′ φA, since the environment
resulting fromA([Q ]) ρ φA will necessarily be a subset of the environment resulting from
A([Q ]) ρ′ φA (i.e. the larger system induces more term substitutions). 
The rule for replication also uses the labelling mechanism to α-convert the set of
bound names and variables of each copy of the replication, !P , as well as its set of
tags. Here fold is the standard folding operator (for sets rather than lists). This re-
naming does not affect the compositionality of the semantics. The rule for conditional
processes, (A7), relies on the equality of two untagged terms under φA. The rule for
tuple splitting, (A8), attempts to split elements of a set of tuples corresponding to the
value of ϕA(φA, L) of a term, L. The φA environment is updated with the tags of the
elements of each tuple. In case no tuples exist in the set, φA is returned unchanged.
The rest of the rules, (A9)–(A11), deal with cryptographic processes. Again, a pro-
cess attempts to decipher (verify) a term, L, closed by ϕA(φA, L). The tags of the
deciphered plaintexts are added to φA. Else φA is returned intact. Finally, rule (RA0)
groups all the environments resulting from the interpretation of processes in ρ with the
union of environments operation, ∪φ .
In order to prove the soundness of the abstract semantics, we first have to prove the
soundness of the ∪φ operation.
Lemma 1 (Soundness of the⋃φ operation).
∀n, k, k′ ∈ N, φ1, . . . , φn ∈ D⊥, φ.1, . . . , φ.n ∈ D.⊥, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} :
(∃M ∈ Term, x ∈V : ϕE (φj ,M) ∈ φj (x) ⇒
∃t ∈ φ.j (αk,k′(x)),M ′ ∈ Term : value_of({t}) = {M ′} ∧
untag(M ′) = fold subk,k′ M bnv(M))
⇒































 (αk,k′(x)),M ′ ∈ Term : value_of({t}) = {M ′} ∧
untag(M ′) = fold subk,k′ M bnv(M))
where fold f e {x1, . . . , xn} = f (xn, . . . , f (x1, e) . . . ) and subk,k′ x y = y[αk,k′(x)/x].
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Proof. The proof is by mathematical induction on the number of elements of sets of φA
and φE environments. Full details are included in [9]. 
The lemma establishes that for any set of concrete environments, {φ1, . . . , φn}, and
their abstract counterparts, {φ.1, . . . , φ.n}, which are related by the abstraction function,











will maintain this relation. Intuitively, the relation states that a term, M , captured by the ϕE
function in the concrete semantics, will appear as a tag, t , in the abstract environment, such
that the value of t is equivalent to an abstract form of M , that is (fold subk,k′ M bnv(M)).
We can now state the soundness of the abstract semantics as follows.
Theorem 4 (Soundness of the abstract semantics).
∀P, ρ, φE , φA, k, k′, E([P ]) ρ φE = (p, φ′E ),A([P ]) ρ φA = φ′A :
(∃M ∈ Term, x ∈V : ϕE (φE ,M) ∈ φE (x) ⇒
∃t ∈ φA(αk,k′(x)) : value_of({t}) = {M ′} ∧
untag(M ′) = fold subk,k′ M bnv(M))
⇒
(∃M ∈ Term, x ∈V : ϕE (φ′E ,M) ∈ φ′E (x) ⇒
∃t ∈ φ′A(αk,k′(x)) : value_of({t}) = {M ′} ∧
untag(M ′) = fold subk,k′ M bnv(M))
where fold f e {x1, . . . , xn} = f (xn, . . . , f (x1, e) . . . ) and subk,k′ x y = y[αk,k′(x)/x].
Proof. The proof is by induction over the structure of the abstract and non-standard
semantics. Details are included in [9]. 
The theorem states that for any term, M , captured in the non-standard semantics by
including its ϕE (φ′E ,M) value in the value of a variable, φ
′
E (x), then that will correspond to
capturing a tag, t , in the abstract semantics, by φ′A(αk,k′(x)). The appropriateness of t is ex-
pressed by the ability to obtain (by folding) an abstract form, fold subk,k′ M bnv(M), of the
concrete term, M , by evaluating t using value_of and untagging the resulting term, M ′, us-
ing untag. More concisely, every concrete term, M , captured in the non-standard semantics
is also captured in the form of the corresponding abstract tag, t , in the abstract semantics.
The main point underlining the theorem is that even though the abstraction prevents the
generation of infinite data (data structures), it does so in a sound manner (since t is present
in φA whenever M is present in φE ) so as not to preclude the analysis of processes that
are capable of generating such infinite data (data structures), albeit the produced results are
approximate (we can only see an abstract form of M through the tags captured in φA).
8. The Intruder I
The specification of the intruder in the spi calculus is inspired by the model presented
by Dolev and Yao [16]. The model describes the general guidelines along which the most
general attacker in cryptographic protocols can be specified. This model was shown by
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Fig. 9. Specification of the Dolev–Yao attacker in the spi calculus.
[59] to be sufficient to subsume any other adversary and the specification is dependent on
the language of choice. In this section, we specify the most general attacking process in
the spi calculus. Informally, any such specification should adhere to the following criteria:
• The attacker can read, learn, modify and block any messages passed over the network’s
public channels, as well as create fresh messages. It can also send the messages it has
in its knowledge to other processes.
• The attacker can compose tuples from learnt messages and can decompose learnt tuples
to their basic elements.
• The attacker can apply cryptographic operations, such as encryption, decryption etc. to
any of the messages it has in its knowledge using any of the keys it knows.
The above features can be stated more formally in the spi calculus by the specification
of Fig. 9, where κinit = (M1, . . . ,Mn) is the initial knowledge of the intruder represented
as a tuple. If n = 0, then we write κinit = ( ). The specification contains the subpro-
cess i〈κinit 〉, which initialises the knowledge of the intruder by communicating with the
input process, i(κ), and hence, yielding the substitution, κ = κinit . Although it is pos-
sible for κinit to take any value, in our analysis of security protocols, we set κinit =
(M1, . . . ,Mn), where for the analysed process, P , running in parallel with I , we have
that {M1, . . . ,Mn} ⊆ fn(P ).2 Moreover, we refer to the set of terms underlying the tuple,
κ (resp. κinit ), as set (κ) (resp. set (κinit )). The knowledge of the intruder, κ , is increased
due to the value-passing behaviour whenever input actions occur or fresh data are created
as part of bound output actions. κ also increases due to the value-processing behaviour
whenever decryption, signature verification or tuple-splitting operations succeed. In both
cases, standard tuple concatenation, + : Term × Term → Term, is used.
Apart from the initialisation process i〈κinit 〉, the rest of the specification consists of a
replication of processes each of which is guarded by an input action, i(κ), over the special
channel i. The input parameter κ is instantiated with tuples of terms. This is necessary to
2 Note that the order of the tuple elements in κinit and κ is not important since we use these tuples merely to
simulate sets.
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be able to express the fact that I can learn from its own behaviour. For example, in order
for κ to obtain the new name net without necessarily outputting net to external processes,
I sends net over channel i. Similarly, in order for κ to learn all the terms it has encrypted,
signed etc., it needs to send them again over channel i. On the other hand, the main body
of the process consists of the parallel composition of all the possible input/output actions
and cryptographic operations quantified over all the terms currently in κ .
9. Security properties
We define in this section security properties based on the results of the abstract in-
terpretation established in the previous section. More precisely, we reason about term
substitutions and their secrecy and authenticity implications as a means of gaining in-
formation. A process classified at a low secrecy level could input data created by another
high-level process, or could decrypt a ciphertext revealing the underlying sensitive plain-
text if it has the appropriate key. Similarly, data authenticity could be compromised if an
untrusted process succeeds in communicating its data to a highly trusted process.
More formally, assume S = (SL,S,&S,unionsqS,(S,⊥S) and A = (AL,A,&A,unionsqA,
(A,⊥A) are finite lattices of secrecy and trust levels, respectively, where l, l′ ∈ SL and
a, a′ ∈ AL. A well-defined security policy then classifies all the bound names and variables
of a system with their secrecy and trust levels using S and A, and according to the security
requirements of the processes to which those names and variables are bound.
Furthermore, let ξS : (N ∪V)→ S and ξA : (N ∪V)→ A be two environments
that map bound names and variables to their secrecy and trust levels, respectively. Hence,
ξS(a) is the secrecy level of a, and ξA(a) is the trust level of a. The null environments are
defined as: ∀x ∈N ∪V : ξS0(x) = ⊥S, ξA0(x) = ⊥A.3 One may define the following
secrecy and authenticity threats.
Definition 2 (Information leakage). A name, a, is said to be leaked within a process, P , if
and only if:
φA = A([P ]) ρ0φA0, ξS, ∃y ∈ dom(φA), a ∈ untag(ϕA(φA, y)) : ξS(y) S ξS(a)
Definition 3 (Authenticity breach). The authenticity requirement of a variable, y, is said to
be breached within a process, P , if and only if:
φA = A([P ]) ρ0φA0, ξA, y ∈ dom(φA), ∃a ∈ untag(ϕA(φA, y)) : ξA(a) A ξA(y)
The information leakage property captures instances where high-level names substitute
low-level variables. Note that the property only captures the secrecy of names, as opposed
to the secrecy of ciphertexts. This stems from our assumption that names are the only sens-
itive data whose secrecy may be compromised. Ciphertexts provide a secure mechanism
with which the secure transmission of names is achievable. For example, in the process,
a〈k〉.a〈{m}k〉 | a(x).a(y).case y of {z}x in P , it is the secrecy of m, rather than {m}k , that
is undermined by P .
3 Note here that by the default values of ξS and ξA, free names are always mapped to bottom levels. This is
the safest assumption since these names are always known to the intruder.
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On the other hand, the direction of the ordering relation in the authenticity property
clearly demonstrates the difference in concern. Intuitively, an authenticity breach occurs
whenever a tag, whose name value has a low trust level, instantiates a variable with a higher
trust level. Hence, we are concerned with highly trusted processes obtaining data not at the
same level of trust. This could be as a result of that data originating from malicious sources.
Notice again (as in information leakage above) that only names are captured and not com-
plex structures, like digital signatures. This is due to the assumption that digital signatures
only provide the means by which names (data) are transmitted in an authentic manner over
public channels. For example, in the process, a〈[{m}]k−〉 | a(x).case x of [{y}]k+ in P , if
P expects a different name, m′, to instantiate y, then it is m, rather than [{m}]k− , that breaks
the authenticity requirement that P expects from y. We next explain the above secrecy and
authenticity properties in light of the SPLICE/AS protocol.
10. Example: The SPLICE/AS protocol
The SPLICE/AS protocol was first suggested by [60] as a public-key protocol that estab-
lishes authentication between two agents. The protocol was found flawed in [61], and two
attacks were published that allowed the intruder to impersonate initiators and responders.
Here, we consider the modified version of the protocol as suggested in [61], where we
have removed the messages dealing with the distribution of the public keys as in [62], and
assumed that both the initiator and the responder have obtained each other’s public keys in
a secure manner. Then the resulting sequence of messages describes the protocol, where N
is a nonce (we have further omitted timestamps):
Message 1 Init → Resp : Init,Resp, {Init, {N}K+Resp}K−Init on cResp
Message 2 Resp → Init : Resp, Init, {Resp, N}K+Init on cInit
These messages establish authentication between an initiator and a responder whenever
the responder verifies successfully the digital signature created by the initiator in the first
message and the initiator receives back its nonce from the responder in the second message.
One may include Messages 3 and 4 to indicate that both the initiator and the responder are
confident enough to exchange secret messages:
Message 3 Init → Resp : {M}N on cResp
Message 4 Resp → Init : {M ′}N on cInit
where we have assumed that nonce N is used as a shared session key. Alternatively, a
separate session key K could be created by the initiator and sent to the responder. The
specification of the modified SPLICE/AS protocol in the spi calculus is given in Fig. 10.
The continuation processes of Init and Resp are denoted by F and F ′, respectively (F and
F ′ are arbitrary dummy values and do not play any role in the analysis). In this specific-
ation, we have used non-recursive definitions Init(X, Y ) and Resp(X, Y ) to describe the
behaviours of the protocol initiator and responder participants. Here, X is an agent variable
representing the identity of the initiator and Y is an agent variable representing the identity
of the responder. Both X and Y may be instantiated by agent names A,B,C . . . . Hence,
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Fig. 10. Specification of the SPLICE/AS protocol.
Init〈A,B〉 ≡ Init[A/X,B/Y ] indicates that the initiator is agent A and it is initiating the
protocol to agent B and Resp〈A,B〉 ≡ Resp[A/X,B/Y ] to indicate that the responder is
agent B and it is expected to respond to agent A.
It is important to distinguish at this point between the concept of a role and that of an
agent. Init and Resp are roles that can be played by the same agent or by different agents. In
general, we assume from now on the presence of two honest agents, A and B. In addition
to these agents, the intruder I exists and it is specified as in Section 8 by the Dolev–Yao
model. Agents A and B are honest in the sense that they can assume no other specification
apart from the Init(X, Y ) and Resp(X, Y ) processes. For example, agent A can act as Init
in one session and as Resp in the next. As a result, it is necessary to include all the possible
combinations involving two agents A and B as is done in the specification of the Protocol
process. Additionally, when A (or B) acts as the initiator or the responder of the protocol
(playing the Init or Resp role), it has the option of communicating with the intruder I .
Therefore, the specification must allow for this possibility equally as well by including the
options Init〈A, I 〉, Init〈B, I 〉, Resp〈I, A〉 and Resp〈I, B〉.
Assuming κinit = (A,B, I,K+I , K−I , K+A ,K+B , cA, cB, cI ), we arrive at the least fixed
point results of Fig. 11 by applying A([Protocol]) {| |}ρ φA0 with α1,1 (uniform analysis).4
The results show the name values for untag(ϕA(φA, x)) for some of the variables, x.
The intruder is also capable of constructing further complex terms from the name subset
4 Non-uniform analyses produce similar results but are more expensive to perform.
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Fig. 11. Results of analysing the SPLICE/AS protocol.
of untag(ϕA(φA, κ)). Examining the results of the abstract interpretation, we find a few
irregularities (which we have underlined to draw the attention of the reader). The intruder
was successful in capturing nonce NAB1 created by A as initiator to B and nonce NBA1
created by B as initiator to A. Messages MAB1 and MBA1 created in sessions between A
and B were also captured. Additionally, we find that initiators, in communication sessions
involving A and B only, have captured messages from, I , that can be any of I ’s names.
In the next section on security analysis, we explain these anomalous results in the light
of an impersonation attack (mentioned by [62]) that is carried out by I on initiators in
communication sessions involving agents A and B. Assuming that agent A is acting as the
initiator and agent B as the responder (I (B) denotes I masquerading as B), the following
steps describe the attack:
Message 1a A→ I (B) : A,B, {A, {N}K+B }K−A on cB
Message 1b I → B : I, B, {I, {N}K+B }K−I on cB
Message 2b B → I : B, I, {B,N}K+I on cI
Message 2a I (B)→ A : B,A, {B,N}K+A on cA
Message 3a A→ I (B) : {M}N on cB
Message 4a I (B)→ A : {M ′}N on cA
The main problem here is in the initiator’s message (Message 1a), which lacks any
indication, inside {N}K+B , to the initiator’s identity (A in this case). Further formalisation
of the security breaches of this attack is given in the next section on security properties.
Note that to be able to capture the attack proposed by Lowe in [63], it is necessary to use a
non-uniform analysis (i.e. k > 1 and k′ > 1 in αk,k′ ), since this attack mainly breaches the
freshness property of messages. For simplicity, we only consider the uniform case.
Authenticity. To discuss the authenticity property of the SPLICE/AS protocol as spe-
cified in Fig. 10, we use the following trust-level classifications, where ⊥A  a:
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ξA(msg1AB) = ξA(msg1BA) = ξA(msg2AB) = ξA(msg2BA) = a
ξA(msg1AI ) = ξA(msg1BI ) = ξA(msg2IA) = ξA(msg2IB) = ⊥A
ξA(κ) = ξA(net1) = ⊥A
ξA(NAB) = ξA(NBA) = ξA(MAB) = ξA(MBA) = ξA(M ′AB) = ξA(M ′BA)
= ξA(vAB) = ξA(vBA) = ξA(v′AB) = ξA(v′BA) = a
ξA(NAI ) = ξA(NBI ) = ξA(MAI ) = ξA(MBI ) = ξA(M ′IB) = ξA(M ′IA)
= ξA(vAI ) = ξA(vBI ) = ξA(v′IB) = ξA(v′IA) = ⊥A
Examining the results of Fig. 11 in light of the above values for ξA, we find that authen-
ticity is breached. For example, consider the value of the msg1AB1 variable, which belongs
to agent A acting as the initiator of the protocol to agent B. Here, we find that the res-
ult net1 ∈ untag(ϕA(φA,msg1AB1)) is possible, and due to the classification ξA(net1) 
ξA(msg1AB1), we have an instance of authenticity breach (Definition 3). A similar breach
also occurs with the msg1BA1 name.
Secrecy. We adopt the following classification of secrecy levels, where ⊥S  l:
ξS(msg1AB) = ξS(msg1BA) = ξS(msg2AB) = ξS(msg2BA) = l
ξS(msg1AI ) = ξS(msg1BI ) = ξS(msg2IA) = ξS(msg2IB) = ⊥S
ξS(κ) = ξS(net1) = ⊥S
ξS(NAB) = ξS(NBA) = ξS(MAB) = ξS(MBA) = ξS(vAB) = ξS(vBA)
= ξS(v′AB) = ξS(v′BA) = l
ξS(NAI ) = ξS(NBI ) = ξS(MAI ) = ξS(MBI ) = ξS(vAI ) = ξS(vBI )
= ξS(v′IB) = ξS(v′IA) = ⊥S
The results of Fig. 11 demonstrate breaches in the information leakage property, as the
intruder captures data created by agentsA andB in sessions involving these two agents. For
example, consider MAB1 ∈ set (untag(ϕA(φA, κ))), which is a message created by A ini-
tiating a session with B. Given that ξS(κ)  ξS(MAB1), we have an instance of Definition
2.
11. Example: The secure FTP server
We consider here a simple secure file transfer protocol (FTP) system:
ftp = (!start(x).(([x = start](ν k)(Server | Client)) |
([x = I_start]((ν k)(Server) | I ))))
| start〈start〉.start〈start〉.start〈start〉.start〈I_start〉
Server = (νdeal) (login(req).case req of {data}k in
(deal〈data〉 | !deal(w).login〈{w}k〉.0))
Client = (ν request) (login〈{request}k〉.login(res).case res of {result}k in 0)
The three start signals spawn three instances of the Client/Server system and the fourth
I_start signal allows the intruder, I , to participate in a session with the server. Each in-
stance of the client/server system shares a session key, k, that is not reusable in subsequent
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sessions. Additionally, communications between the server and the client or intruder pro-
cesses are carried out over a public login channel, login. The client process sends the
request encrypted with the session key and then waits for the result back from the server,
which it then decrypts using the same key. The server process accepts an encrypted request
and deals with it. For simplicity, the server just routes back the request over the login
channel encrypted with the session key, and then, it terminates.
Assuming the intruder’s initial knowledge is set to κinit = {login, k}, and applying
A([ftp]) {| |}ρ φA0, with α1,1 (uniform analysis), then converting back from tags to names us-
ing the untag function, we obtain values for κ %→ {net1, request1, login, k1} and result1 %→
{net1, request1, login, k1} in the resulting φA. The interpretation detects that the intruder
is capable of obtaining the request name and that the result variable captures other values
than the original request. These are false positive values since the uniform analysis does
not distinguish between the different copies of k. Therefore, it appears to be possible for the
intruder to decrypt any of the ciphertexts outputted over login. Moreover, it is impossible
to distinguish between the information each instance of the client and server processes
obtains.
To refine the above results, we increase the values of k and k′ from α1,1 to α4,4. The
intermediate values of k = 2, k′ = 2 and k = 3, k′ = 3 will still yield the above false
positives for k = 1, k′ = 1 (since the intruder’s session interferes with clients’ sessions),
therefore, we do not include them here. However, when performing the analysis for k = 4,
k′ = 4, we obtain κ %→ {net1, net2, net3, net4, login, k4}, result1 %→ {request1}, result2 %→
{request2} and result3 %→ {request3}. These values reveal that the intruder is incapable of
obtaining information from sessions involving clients. Also, a more precise distribution of
information between the three copies of the client and server processes is reflected in the
results.
Another version of the FTP system may contain a faulty client specified as:
Client = (ν request) (login〈{request}k〉.login(res).case res of {result}k in covert〈k〉)
The specification of the client reveals, over the public covert channel covert channel, its
session key, which it shares with the server, to the intruder. Performing the static analysis
for α1,1 and setting the knowledge of the intruder to κinit = {covert, login, k}, we ob-
tain that κ %→ {net1, k1, request1, login, covert} and result1 %→ {k1, request1, login, net1,
covert}.
Refining the analysis further by setting α4,4 reveals that the intruder, in fact, can only
capture the session key (since the client reveals it over the covert channel), since,
κ %→ {net1, net2, net3, net4, login, covert, k1, k2, k3, k4}, result1 %→ {request1}, result2 %→
{request2} and result3 %→ {request3}. These results reveal that the intruder is incapable of
compromising the system, even in the case where it compromises the password of each
client.
Secrecy. To analyse for secrecy, we adopt the following secrecy levels:
ξS(κ) = ξS(x1,2,3,4) = ξS(net1,2,3,4) = ξS(login) = ξS(start) = ξS(I_start)
= ξS(covert) = ξS(deal4) = ξS(w4) = ξS(k4) = ⊥L
ξS(k1,2,3) = ξS(w1,2,3) = ξS(deal1,2,3) = ξS(result1,2,3) = ξS(request1,2,3) = l
with ⊥L  l. The results of the uniform analysis (with correct client specification) with
α1,1 indicate that the intruder is capable of capturing request1, which has a higher secrecy
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level than κ . Refining these results further, we find that the non-uniform analysis, with
α4,4, reveals a correct distribution of names to input parameters. In particular, the intruder’s
knowledge, κ , could not obtain any names with higher secrecy levels and remained limited
to names like net and login and its own key, k4.
However, examining the results of the non-uniform analysis (with faulty client specific-
ation) with α4,4, we find that Definition 2 is satisfied and an information leakage occurs.
This secrecy breach occurs with the value of κ , which captures the secret session keys,
k1,2,3. Since ξS(k1,2,3) = l and ξS(κ) = ⊥L according to the above name classification,
we have that ξS(κ)  ξS(k1,2,3). It is clear that this breach happened as a result of the
client sending its session key over the covert channel, which is a free name recognised by
the intruder.
Authenticity. we adopt here the following classification for trust levels:
ξA(κ) = ξA(x1,2,3,4) = ξA(net1,2,3,4) = ξA(login) = ξA(start) = ξA(I_start)
= ξA(covert) = ξA(deal4) = ξA(w4) = ξA(k4) = ⊥A
ξA(k1,2,3) = ξA(w1,2,3) = ξA(deal1,2,3) = ξA(result1,2,3) = ξA(request1,2,3) = a
with⊥A  a. In both analyses (with correct and faulty client specifications), using α4,4, we
find that input parameters captured the appropriate names and no instance of the process
authenticity breach occurred (Definition 3). The case of the faulty client is interesting,
since the intruder, I , failed in passing its low-level data to the clients, even though it clearly
breaches the secrecy of their session keys as indicated above. This is due to the fact that the
keys are per session, i.e. each time a copy of the system is spawned the keys are renamed.
Hence, the intruder cannot use a key it obtains from the client in the intruder’s own session
with the FTP server. Hence, the authenticity property is preserved despite a failure in the
secrecy property of the protocol.
12. Spicaso: a spi calculus analyser for security objectives
The static analysis developed in the previous sections was implemented in an initial
prototype, Spicaso, using Objective Caml (OCaml) version 3.02. The main modules of the
program are stated in the following paragraphs.
Module Term. This module defines the structure of terms in the spi calculus. The main
data type in this module is term, and its definition is shown in Fig. 12. For simplicity, we
only considered 2-element tuples (pairs).
SECCIPHER is the secret-key ciphertext constructor, PUBCIPHER is the public-key cipher-
text constructor and SIGCIPHER is the digital signature constructor. The first element of
each constructor represents the plaintext and the second represents the encryption/signature
key. Names are represented by NAME, variables by VAR, private keys by PRV_KEY and public
keys by PUB_KEY. Secret session keys are instantiated as names, constructed by NAME. For
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Fig. 12. The term data type in Spicaso.
Fig. 13. The process data type in Spicaso.
Module Process. The module denotes what a process is in the spi calculus. This is
defined in Fig. 13. The module also provides operations for substitutions of terms and the
renaming of bound names, variables and tags. Although the use of type term is generic
in the definition of the process type, we still assume the appropriate usage of names as
channels and secret session keys. Other keys must also have the appropriate type. In the
case of SPLIT, the first term is the pair to be split. The subsequent terms are the variables
instantiated by the two elements of the pair. These variables are bound to the first process.
Similarly, for the case of the secret-key decryption construct, SECDECRYPT, the first term
represents the ciphertext to be decrypted, using the second term (a name). The result, if
successful, is bound to the third term in the first process. The same applies to public-
key decryption, PUBDECRYPT, and digital signature verification, SIGVERIFY. The process
module also includes the environments, tag_to_term and term_to_tag, mapping tags to
terms and vice versa.
Module Phi. This module holds mappings from variables to sets of tags. The main type
here is phi = (term * term list) list, where the generic term will only be used for
the particular case of NAME.
Module Rho. This module has one main type:
rho = Process.process list
which represents the ρ multiset of processes.
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Fig. 14. Results of the analysis of some authentication protocols.
Module Spicaso. This is the main abstract interpretation module in Spicaso. The mod-
ule contains the following function:
val spicaso : Process.process -> Process.process list -> int ->
Process.name list -> (Process.term * Process.term) list ->
(Process.term * Process.term list) list
which represents the abstract semantic relation A([P ]) ρ φA. The function takes as inputs
the specification of the process to be analysed P , a list of initial processes running in
parallel ρ, a number representing the abstraction constraint n, a list of names representing
the initial knowledge of the intruder and finally, a list of pairs representing the mappings
from terms to their tags. The outcome is the list representing ϕA(φA, x) for each variable,
x, in the domain of φA. The variable, intruder, is preserved for the final knowledge, κ ,
of the Dolev–Yao attacker. Additionally, the Spicaso prototype establishes the security of
a number of authentication protocols, under the restrictions shown in Fig. 14.
Future work related to the Spicaso tool will concentrate on analysing and enhancing the
performance of the tool as well as using the non-uniformity of the φA in defining other
security properties, mainly freshness.
13. Conclusion
We have presented in this paper a non-uniform static analysis for infinite systems with
cryptographic capabilities specified in the language of the spi calculus. The analysis is
characterised as being fully compositional since it follows the denotational approach. This
facilitates the implementation of the analysis in functional programming and provides
handy mathematical tools, like least fixed points and domains.
As part of the overall approach, the paper also defined a denotational semantics for
the spi calculus that is a direct extension of Stark’s domain theoretic model describing
processes in the -calculus. This semantics was then extended to a non-standard semantics
that captures the property of term substitutions when communications and cryptographic
operations take place, in addition to capturing the standard meaning. However, in order to
arrive at a computable analysis, the concrete non-standard semantics was then abstracted
to operate over a finite domain. A couple of security properties, the information leakage
and authenticity breach, were then defined based on the results of the analysis. Given
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a specification of the Dolev–Yao attacker, an example protocol, SPLICE/AS, was then
analysed for these security properties.
There are a number of directions that the static analysis can be extended towards. In
particular, other security properties can be accommodated like communication secrecy
and message independence. We discuss these two properties very briefly in the follow-
ing paragraphs. Communication secrecy refers to the secrecy of communicated data with
reference to the secrecy levels of the channels over which the data are communicated. This
is different from Definition 2 (Section 9), since it is a name-channel rather than a name-
variable relationship. For example, consider the simple system, (νb)c〈b〉.P |c(z).Q, where
ξS(b) = ξS(z) = l and we set ξS(c) = ⊥Sl. Then, it is clear that b is not leaked to z.
However, b is sent dangerously over c, since its secrecy level is higher than that of c.
To be able to capture breaches in the communication secrecy, the channel over which
a term travels must be associated with that name. For example, it is possible to include
in the meaning of a process, an environment, Tag → ℘(N), mapping every message,
as represented by its tag, to a set of possible channels over which the message is sent.
Such association could be used then to compare the level of the message to the levels of
its possible channels. The presence of a channel with a lower secrecy level indicates an
insecure communication.
Also, in our static analysis, it is possible to detect a weak form of the message inde-
pendence property, which relies on a special equivalence that we term abstract testing
equivalence. Intuitively, assuming that, A([P | I ]) ρ φA = φAP and A([Q | I ]) ρ φA =
φAQ, are the results of analysing processes P and Q in parallel with the intruder, I , then P
is abstract testing equivalent to Q, written as P )A Q, if and only if φAP (κ) = φAQ(κ).
In other words, the intruder is incapable of distinguishing (using its knowledge, κ), between
running in parallel with P and running in parallel with Q.
Now, assume that an open process, P(x), is a process that can be instantiated by sub-
stituting a variable, x, for any name, m, which yields the instance P [m/x]. P(x) then
is said to be abstract message-independent with respect to the intruder, I , if and only if
∀m, n ∈N : P [m/x] )A P [n/x]. This implies that choosing any two names inN to ob-
tain instances of P(x) should always result in the same abstract knowledge of the intruder
composed with each of those instances. Hence, the intruder cannot find any difference
when abstractly interpreted in parallel with P [m/x] from P [n/x].
Finally, an interesting direction for future research would be to investigate security
properties that change across the different sessions of a protocol, for example, message
freshness. We recognise that such properties will require a non-uniform set-up for our
static analysis, in order to be able to distinguish between two or more copies of the same
name.
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